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Introduction
The impetus for the enactment of the Sports Broadcasting Act1
(the SBA) occurred eight years before its 1961 enactment. In the 1953
case United States v. NFL2 (NFL 1953), Judge Grim of the Eastern
District Court of Pennsylvania allowed contractual restriction on the
telecasting of games into a member club's "home territory" when that
team played at home.' However, the court prohibited other restric-
tive measures used by the NFL and its officials.4 In the 1961 case
United States v. NFL5 (NFL 1961), Judge Grim used the 1953 decision
to hold that the National Football League (NFL) was prohibited from
entering into an agreement to sell the pooled rights of its member
clubs.
6
Congress enacted the SBA to overcome the effects of the 1961
ruling, and passed an exemption to the antitrust laws to permit a
league to sell package deals to broadcasting companies for the exclu-
sive telecast or transmission of league games.7 Congress cited the
danger of League failure and the interest of sports fans in its decision
to enact the exemption. 8
In late August 1994, three sports fans filed a class action lawsuit
against all of the major sports leagues and networks in Durkin v. Ma-
jor League Baseball.9 The complaint alleges that the leagues violated
the SBA by selling broadcast rights to cable networks ESPN and Tur-
ner Broadcasting. The plaintiffs contend that the SBA specifically
covers only "free" broadcast networks.1" The complaint also claims
that every league, except the NFL, fails to share its network broadcast
profits as anticipated.1' Finally, the fans claim that, considering the
advances in broadcast technology, the SBA is no longer necessary to
ensure that a team's away games are broadcast in their home
market. 1
2
1. Sports Broadcasting Act, Pub. L. No. 87-331 (15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-95 (1988)).
2. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
3. Id. at 330.
4. Id.
5. 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
6. Id.
7. S. Rep. No. 1087, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3042 [hereinafter Senate Report].
8. Id.
9. Durkin v. Major League Baseball, No. 2:94-CV-05315 (E.D. Pa. filed Aug. 29,
1994).
10. Emily Culbertson, Broadcasting Act Still Necessary?; Fans File Suit, LEGAL INTEL-




THE SPORTS BROADCASTING ACT
This Note will discuss the fans' contention that the SBA has failed
to benefit fans as it was intended. 3 The Durkin suit provides the
court the opportunity to clarify the following issues: Is the SBA
meant to benefit the league or the fans?14 Is the SBA applicable to
cable contracts or only "free" broadcast networks? And, are the
leagues supposed to share the revenue generated by the league-wide
television contracts the SBA authorizes? The viability of the suit
hinges the intent of Congress in drafting the SBA. Mainly, this Note
will focus on the fans' contentions and Congressional intent, while dis-
cussing different theories regarding the SBA.
Section I provides a brief history of the SBA, beginning with the
two court decisions that led Congress to pass the SBA. Section II dis-
cusses several theories challenging the necessity of the SBA, including
the single-entity theory, interpretations of congressional intent, and an
extension of the Supreme Court's reasoning in NCAA v. Board of Re-
gents of the University of Oklahoma,15 in which the Court, addressing
a Sherman Act challenge to the broadcast restrictions on the NCAA,
stated that the broadcasting rights to college football were a "unique
product."' 6 Section III focuses on theories supporting the SBA, dis-
cusses an alternate interpretation of congressional intent, and exam-
ines the special interest nature of the SBA. Section IV concludes that
the Durkin court should continue the tradition of finding that sports
leagues are not single-entities and that the SBA is special interest leg-
islation meant to protect the professional sports leagues for which it
was passed.
I
The History of The Sports Broadcasting Act
In 1953, the Department of Justice brought an antitrust action
against the NFL,'7 alleging a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.' The action focused on Article X of the NFL by-laws. 9 The
four relevant provisions of Article X were: 1) the prohibition against
13. Whether the fans have standing or have suffered antitrust injury will not be ad-
dressed. Instead, the focus will be solely on the substantive issues raised.
14. Clearly, a benefit to the league will indirectly benefit the fans by allowing them to
continue viewing professional sports. The question remains, however, whether the SBA
sought to keep sports leagues financially viable in the long run or merely make it easier for
fans to watch sports competition.
15. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
16. Id. See also infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
17. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
18. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
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telecasting outside games into the home territory of a team on days
when that team is playing at home;2° 2) the prohibition against tele-
casting outside games into the home territory of a team on days when
that team is playing away from home while permitting the telecast of
its game into its home territory;21 3) the prohibition of radio broad-
casting outside games into the home territory of a team on days when
that team is playing at home, or when it is away and permitting the
game to be broadcast or televised into its home territory;22 and 4) a
grant of unlimited power to the Football Commissioner to prevent any
and all clubs from televising or broadcasting any or all games.23
Judge Grim had "little doubt" that Article X constituted a con-
tract in restraint of trade. 24 The purpose and effect was to restrict
outside competition on the part of other teams in the home area of
each club.25 Judge Grim refused, however, to find the provisions ille-
gal on that basis alone. Instead, he examined whether the imposed
restraint merely regulated, and thereby "promote[d] competition[,] or
whether it [was] such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
26
To be illegal, a contract must cause "both a restraint of trade and
an unreasonable restraint of trade. '27 Citing the unique nature of the
league,28 Judge Grim determined that, while it is vital that the teams
compete vigorously on the field, if the teams were to compete against
each other as "hard as they can in a business way, the stronger teams
would be likely to drive the weaker ones into financial failure.
'29 If
this were to happen, the entire league could fail. Thus, "without a
league no team can operate profitably.
30
19. Article X provided that no club "shall cause or permit a game in which it is en-
gaged to be telecast or broadcast by a station within 75 miles of another League City on
the day that the home club of the other city is either playing a game in its home city or is
playing away from home and broadcasting or televising its game by use of a station within




23. Id. at 321-22.
24. Id. at 322.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1917)).
27. Id. at 323; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Appalach-
ian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 (1911).




Applying the rule of reason, 31 Judge Grim found the outside
blackout when a team is at home to be a legal restraint of trade, be-
cause it "adds to their home game attendance by preventing potential
spectators from staying at home to watch on television exciting
outside head-on games between strong teams."' 32 Judge Grim found
the other three provisions unreasonable, and therefore illegal, re-
straints of trade.33 The court struck down the first two restrictions
because they could.not be shown to protect a home team's gate reve-
nue.34 The court struck down the final restriction because it granted
the League Commissioner "unlimited and arbitrary power.
35
In April 1961, the NFL and Columbia Broadcasting Systems
(CBS) entered into a contract which required that each "club will pool
its television rights with those of all of the other clubs, and that only
the resulting package of pooled television rights will be sold to a pur-
chaser."'36 The member clubs had agreed to eliminate competition
among themselves. In construing his 1953 decision, Judge Grim found
the new television contract to be illegal as an unreasonable restraint of
trade.37
This decision immediately sent fans into an uproar about their
inability to view the upcoming football season.38 Congress reacted
quickly to overrule the effect of Judge Grim's decision. Just two
months after the decision, Congress passed the SBA. 39 The exemp-
31. The rule of reason was first announced by the Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The rule examines whether a restraint of trade is reasonable. If
so, the restraint is not a violation of section I of the Sherman Act.
32. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. at 325. See Cori Jan Ching, Note, A Critique of
the National Football League's "Blackout" Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 8 J. OF LEG.
104, 108 (1981).
33. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. at 326-28; Ronald Waldman, Note, Antitrust
Law-Signal-Penetration or Station-Location: The Scope of the National Football League's
Television Blackout Antitrust Exemption, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 877, 878 (1984); Michael
J. Kaplan, Annotation, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to Professional Sports, 18
A.L.R. FED. 489 (1993).
34. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. at 326-27.
35. Id. at 327.
36. United States v. NFL, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
37. Id.
38. Ching, supra note 32, at 110.
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-95 (1988). Blaich v. NFL, 212 F. Supp. 319, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Ching, supra note 32, at 110-11; See Senate Report, supra note 7.
The relevant sections of the SBA for the purposes of this Note are 1291 and 1292.
Section 1291 provides:
The antitrust laws.., shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among persons
engaging in or conducting the organized professional team sports of football,
baseball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs ... sells or otherwise transfers
all or any part of the rights of such league's member clubs in the sponsored tele-
casting of games ... engaged in or conducted by such clubs.
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tion applies to transfers by the league, and not to league prohibitions
of transfers by individual teams.40
The Senate Report provides some insight into the rationale for
the exemption.41 According to the Senate, the SBA was meant to
"enable" professional sports leagues to pool their "sponsored" tele-
casting rights into a "package" and sell this package to a purchaser,
such as a television network.42  The legislation was purportedly
needed to overrule Judge Grim's 1961 decision, 3 which barred the
NFL from selling the pooled television rights of its member clubs,
while other leagues such as the National Basketball Association
(NBA), the National Hockey League (NHL), and the American Foot-
ball League (AFL), were engaging in substantially similar agree-
ments.44 The "apparent inequity" of this result was a chief concern
for the Senate when it considered the enactment of the SBA. 5
The Senate Report further describes the importance of "pack-
age" sales in order to maintain the continued operation of the
league.16 As in NFL 1953, the report focuses on maintaining the in-
come of the weaker teams of the league. Without the "package" sale,
the Senate feared, only a "handful" of teams would "be able to secure
coverage on the limited network facilities now available.
47
Finally, the report states that the committee is "of the opinion
that the public interest in viewing professional league sports warrants
some accommodation of antitrust principles."4 8 Essentially, the re-
port mentions fan viewership only after extensively discussing the re-
quirements to keep the NFL financially stable.49
15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
Section 1292 excludes from the section 1291 antitrust exemption "any joint agreement
described in... [section 1291] which prohibits any person to whom such rights are sold or
transferred from televising any games within any area, except within the home territory of
a member club of the league on a day when such club is playing a game at home." 15
U.S.C. § 1292 (1988).
40. Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1991),
affd, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992) (league rule restricting the number of games that an
individual team could sell to a "superstation" found to be an illegal restraint of trade).
41. Senate Report, supra note 7, at 3042-44.
42. Id. at 3042.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 3043.
45. Id.
46. Id. "[Tihere is danger that the structure of the league would become impaired and
its continued operation imperiled." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 3044.
49. Id.
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II
Theories Criticizing The Sports Broadcasting Act
Several theories criticize the SBA. The single-entity theory posits
that, because a professional sports league is a single entity, it cannot
violate the antitrust laws.50 The two other criticisms focus on the in-
tent of Congress when it passed the SBA. One theory states that the
SBA applies only to free television, and not to cable contracts. 51 The
other theory states that congressional intent was to benefit the fans,
which the SBA currently fails to do.
52
A. The Single-Entity Theory
Because of the unique economic characteristics of a professional
sports league, some scholars argue that member teams must be
treated as a single entity.53 The theory focuses primarily on the
unique nature of the product that a league produces. Essentially, a
league produces competition.54 Supporters of the single entity theory
argue that the professional sports league is unique in its 'unusual but
necessary" mixture of cooperation and competition between mem-
bers, not normally found in any other kind of joint venture or partner-
ship.55 The supporters base their reasoning largely on the Supreme
Court's decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 6
In Copperweld, the Court held that a parent corporation and its
wholly owned subsidiary are not legally capable of conspiring with
each other in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.57 Proponents
of the single-entity theory argue that the reasoning in Copperweld
50. Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity
Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L. J. 25, 30 (1991) (compiling the single-
entity articles both pro and con); Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the Single Entity
Theory, 63 TUL. L. Rv. 751 (1989); Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football
League as A Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Con-
sumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1983); Gary R. Roberts, The Single Entity
Status of Sports Leagues Under Section I of the Sherman Act: An Alternative View, 60 TUL.
L. REV. 562 (1986).
51. This is an argument that the fans assert in their class action suit. Culbertson, supra
note 10, at 9.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 77-90.
53. See supra note 50.
54. See Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 672 (7th Cir.
1992) ("Cooperation off the field is essential to produce intense rivalry on it-rivalry that
is essential ... for audience."). See Jacobs, supra note 50, at 32.
55. Jacobs, supra note 50, at 29.
56. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
57. Id. at 777. See Jacobs, supra note 50, at 36.
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should be extended to encompass "unique" joint ventures. 58 Profes-
sional sports leagues are purportedly "unique" because the member
teams cannot produce their product without complete "integration
and cooperation of each and every member of the league. '59 Also, "a
league member team does not and cannot lawfully have any relevant
independent productive function outside its existence as a wholly inte-
grated member of the league."6 Supporters of the single-entity the-
ory claim that such characteristics are enough to make the leagues
"unique," thus entitling them to different treatment by the antitrust
laws. 61 Adoption of the single-entity theory would render the SBA
moot. There would be no point in granting the leagues an antitrust
exemption if professional sports leagues were deemed single entities.
However, the supporters' reliance on the so-called unique mix of
competition and cooperation required by professional sports leagues
seems to be unfounded. All joint venturers need to cooperate with
one another in order to produce and sell their product.6 z The Court
recognized this and, when examining allegations of section 1 viola-
tions, simply chose to apply the rule of reason rather than find the
challenged agreements per se illegal.63 The supporters, however, con-
tend that the reasoning of Copperweld should be extended to encom-
pass professional sports leagues.6
The proponents argue that Copperweld's holding that section 1 of
the Sherman Act does not apply to a parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary because they always have "a unity of purpose or a common
design" 65 should be extended to professional sports leagues. They ar-
gue that although each team is independently owned, the members of
58. Jacobs, supra note 50, at 35. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 50; Roberts, supra note
50.
59. Roberts, supra note 50, at 120.
60. Id.
61. Jacobs, supra note 50, at 29.
62. See Jacobs, supra note 50, at 34.
63. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979);
NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). But see United States v.
Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (market division by grocery stores of their jointly made
product found to be per se illegal as price fixing).
The Topco decision has been criticized because the Court failed to recognize that the
grocery stores had combined to produce a product that they would be incapable of produc-
ing alone. See, e.g, ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 275-79 (1978); Edward Brunet, Streamlining Antitrust Litigation by "Facial
Examination" of Restraints: The Burger Court and the Per Se-Rule of Reason Distinction,
60 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1984); Richard Schmalensee, Agreements Between Competitors,
in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 98 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J.
Teece eds., 1992).
64. See Jacobs, supra note 50, at 35.
65. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
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the league share a "unity of interest."66 Namely, the league members
strive to promote league competition and maintain the economic well
being of every club.67
Again, the reliance on Copperweld seems to be misplaced. Cop-
perwe'ld focused solely dn a 'parent corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary.68 It made no mention of joint ventures. 69 In Rothery Stor-
age & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines Inc.,7 the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court held that joint venturers could not take advantage of the
single-entity theory, in part because they were "legally separate cor-
porations," possibly competing against one another.7' Since each
team in a professional sports league is "financially, legally, and mana-
gerially distinct" from the other members, the Copperweld require-
ment of complete unity of interest and control is missing.72
Courts considering antitrust allegations against sports leagues
have often assumed that the league Was not a single-entity. 73 In two
cases in which the NFL asserted the single-entity theory as a defense
to the alleged antitrust violations, the Second and Ninth Circuits re-
jected the defense. 74 Finally, in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Part-
66. See Jacobs, supra note 50, at 33.
67. NASL v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1253 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[T]he economic success of each
franchise is dependent on... the economic strength of other league members. Damage to
or losses by any league member can adversely affect the stability, success and operation of
other members."); United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953) ("If all the
teams should compete as hard as they can in a business way, the stronger teams would be
likely to drive the weaker ones into financial failure. If this should happen not only would
the weaker teams fail, but eventually the whole league ... would fail.").
68. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 755.
69. Jacobs, supra note 50, at 37.
70. 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
71. Id. at 214; Jacobs, supra note 50, at 39.
72. Jacobs, supra note 50, at 40.
73. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (antitrust action based on league collec-
tive bargaining policy); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1177 n.11 (D.C. Cir.
1978) ("Professional football, like all professional sports, excepting baseball, is subject to
the antitrust laws."); Kapp v. NFL, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907
(1979) (the NFL is an unincorporated association consisting of member clubs); Mackey v.
NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (the NFL is an
unincorporated association); Linesman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D.
Conn. 1977) (the World Hockey Association rule setting age restriction on players is a
group boycott); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (the NBA is a joint
venture); Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (the NHL violated the Sherman Act, section 2, in its efforts to preclude
players from joining WHA teams); United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
74. Jacobs, supra note 50, at 39. See NASL v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (NFL assertion of the single entity theory rejected when de-
fending NFL's prohibition of cross-ownership preventing league members from owing a
team in another league); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381
(9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting NFL assertion that it is a single-entity). But see San Francisco
nership v. NBA,75 the Seventh Circuit simply declined to consider the
single-entity theory and assumed that the NBA was a joint venture.76
Thus, while the debate may continue among scholars, it appears
that the courts have decided the issue correctly, and that professional
sports leagues will be considered joint ventures, not single-entities.
Under these circumstances, the SBA remains important. If sports
leagues were found to be single-entities, plaintiffs would be unable to
attack them under section 1 of the Sherman Act, and the SBA would
not be needed.
B. Congressional Intent
1. The Sports Broadcasting Act Only Applies to "Free" Television
The fans in Durkin and commentators have argued that the SBA
only applies to "free" television and not to contracts with cable televi-
sion.7 7 This argument apparently hinges on the use of the term "spon-
sored" television in the SBA.78
One commentator focuses primarily on the testimony of then
NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle during hearings before the House
Antitrust Subcommittee: specifically, Rozelle's apparent knowledge
that the bill "covers only the free telecasting of professional sports
contests, and does not cover pay TV."79 The author concludes that
because of Rozelle's assertion, the SBA must not apply to package
sales to cable networks, such as ESPN and SportsChannel.80 Instead,
the SBA should be "narrowly construed" to exclude package sales to
cable stations.81 Ross' "beady eyes and green eyeshades"82 focus only
on the Committee's statement that the "public interest in viewing pro-
fessional league sports warrants some accommodation of antitrust
principles.
83
Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (the NHL is a single entity incapable
of conspiring in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act).
75. 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992).
76. Id. at 673.
77. Culbertson, supra note 10, at 9; Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports
League Contracts with Cable Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463 (1990).
78. Ross, supra note 77, at 470.
79. Id. (citing Telecasting of Professional Sports Contests: Hearings on H.R. 8757
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust (subcomm'n Np. 5) of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1961)).
80. Ross, supra note 77, at 470.
81. Id. at 471. Courts have consistently stated that antitrust exemptions are to be con-
strued narrowly with minimal compromise to the antitrust laws. Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd.
Partnership v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1352 (N.D. II. 1991), affd, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.
1992) (citing Group Life & Health Ins. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979)).
82. Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1992).
83. Senate Report, supra note 7, at 3044. See Ross, supra note 77, at 469.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 17:945
THE SPORTS BROADCASTING ACT
The focus on Rozelle's statement, however, is misplaced. Ro-
zelle's statement was made over thirty years ago, at a time when cable
television was a relatively rare form of transmission.' Today, cable
television is the way in which the majority of television owning house-
holds'receive their broadcasts.85 The nature of broadcasting has
changed since the SBA was first passed, and to argue that "spon-
sored" television only applies to over-the-air broadcasting ignores the
profound changes in the broadcast industry that have occurred in the
thirty-four years since the passage of the SBA.86 Instead, it would
seem that the court in Chicago Professional Sports was correct in stat-
ing that the distinction between "sponsored" television and pay televi-
sion is "meaningless today, since virtually all over-the-air and cable
TV broadcasts carry advertising from commercial sponsors."87
2. The Primary Intent of Congress Was to Benefit the Fans
Ross further argues that the SBA should be interpreted according
to the clear intent of Congress.88 According to Ross, the SBA was
meant to promote the viewership of games.89 More specifically, the
SBA was meant to allow viewers to view the games that most inter-
ested them, the games of their local team.90 However, as will be dis-
cussed below, another (and more plausible) reading of congressional
intent is that Congress intended to keep the NFL (and other profes-
sional sports leagues) financially viable, and remove inequities that
might have existed between the various leagues and their broadcasting
contracts. 91
84. By 1960, there were approximately 640 cable services serving 650,000 subscribers.
SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION OF
ABUNDANCE 31 (1971). These were purely local services which "left television as a whole
unruffled." Id. at 24.
85. There are approximately 92 million television households in the United States.
ESPN, a cable station, reaches approximately 53 million homes, roughly 58% of all homes
with televisions. See Ross, supra note 77, at 497 n.64 (citing NIELSON MEDIA RESEARCH,
NIELSON STATION INDEX 1 (Sept. 1989) and CHANNELS, 1990 FIELD GUIDE 78 (Dec.
1989)).
86. See supra notes 84-85.
87. Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1364 (N.D. I11.
1991), affid, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992).
88. Ross, supra note 77, at 469.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See infra part III.A. See generally Senate Report, supra note 7, at 3042-44.
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3. Extending the Reasoning of NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma
In NCAA the Court declined to find the NCAA's limitations on a
member's television contract to be per se illegal, instead choosing to
adopt the rule of reason.92 The University of Oklahoma challengecl
the NCAA's restrictions on the number of television appearances its
football team would be allowed to make over a two year span. 93 The
Court held that the agreement had the effect of raising prices and re-
ducing output,94 and that the restrictions on competition were
unreasonable.95
The Court also stated that "[s]ince broadcasting rights to college
football constitute a unique product for which there is no ready substi-
tute, there is no need for collective action in order to enable the prod-
uct to compete against its nonexistent competitors. '96 Applying this
reasoning to professional sports, the argument could be made that
each individual sport is a unique product. Hockey is unique, and
therefore basketball is not a substitute. Thus, extending the reasoning
of NCAA, there is no reason for the NHL to negotiate a collective
television contract. This argument, however, contradicts the very
existence of the SBA. The SBA was passed because Congress felt that
collective action on the part of professional sports leagues was neces-
sary to maintain their financial viability. 97 Thus, if a court were to
extend the reasoning from NCAA, it would directly contradict the in-
tent of Congress in passing the SBA. Also, in cases subsequent to
NCAA, courts have not extended the reasoning of the Court, and
have instead focused on interpreting the SBA and not invalidating it.98
III
Theories Supporting The Sports Broadcasting Act
There are at least two theories which support the SBA, both of
which focus on Congress. The first theory focuses on Congress' intent
when enacting the law, and the second focuses on the very nature of
the SBA.
92. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-04 (1984).
93. Id. at 94-95. The plan limited the number of appearances to no more than six, four
of which could be national, in a two year period. Id.
94. Id. at 113.
95. Id. at 120.
96. Id. at 115 (footnote omitted).
97. See generally Senate Report, supra note 7, at 3043.
98. See generally Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336
(N.D. I11. 1991), aff"d, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992).
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A. Congressional Intent to Keep Sports Leagues Financially Viable
Examining the legislative history of the SBA, it appears that the
main concern of the Committee on the Judiciary was keeping the NFL
financially viable.99 During hearings before the Antitrust Subcommit-
tee of the House Judiciary Committee, the discussion revolved around
the need to make package sales by leagues.' The NFL argued that
they had to make package sales "to assure the weaker clubs of the
league continuing television income... on a basis of substantial equal-
ity with the stronger clubs."'' Also, the television revenues were
"such a significant part of the overall financial success of a profes-
sional football team ... " that it was "necessary to prevent too great
disparity in the television income of the various clubs."'01 2 The legisla-
tive history also recognizes that "should the weaker teams be allowed
to flounder, there is danger that the structure of the league would be-
come impaired and [the NFL's] continued operation imperilled.'
0 3
Not only did Congress focus on the need to keep the leagues finan-
cially viable, they also focused on the "inequity" of forbidding the
NFL from using package sales when other sports leagues employed
package television contracts.1
0 4
The legislative history also mentions that fan interest in viewing
professional sports warrants the exception to the antitrust laws. 5
Throughout the report, however, the fan interest appears as an ancil-
lary benefit to the primary goal of keeping the league financially via-
ble.' 0 6 The report recognizes that maintaining the league itself is the
best way to ensure that fans may view the games of their local club.' 7
The primary goal of the SBA, however, was to keep professional
sports leagues from financial failure; ensuring fan viewership was a
secondary objective.





104. Id. The report states that the American Football League, the National Basketball
Association, and the National Hockey League had all employed package television con-
tracts. Id. at 3042-43.
105, Id. at 3044.
106. The SBA is necessary "to assure the weaker clubs.., television income and televi-
sion coverage...." Id. at 3043 (emphasis added). "[V]iewers... may be unable to see the
road games of their home team on television." Id.
107. Id.
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B. The Sports Broadcasting Act is Special Interest Legislation
The SBA is special interest legislation."°8 The Seventh Circuit de-
scribed the SBA as a "single-industry exception to a law designed for
the protection of the public."' 9 The implications of this statement are
enormous. As an exception to the antitrust laws, Congress decided
that there was sufficient justification to enact the SBA even though it
would not necessarily protect (or benefit) the public. 110 As discussed
above, the SBA was passed to ensure league viability and equity.
The argument that the SBA was meant to benefit the fans runs
contrary to the very nature of the SBA."1 The SBA is an exemption.
The antitrust laws themselves are meant to protect the public; exemp-
tions are not. Rather, the exemption is meant to protect the special
interest. It is difficult to see how an exemption to laws meant to pro-
tect the public could also benefit the public. Thus, as special interest




The Durkin suit presents an opportunity for the District Court of
Eastern Pennsylvania to review many of the different theories sur-
rounding the SBA. In general, controversy over the SBA has been
difficult for the courts to understand. The Seventh Circuit, in af-
firming the Northern District of Illinois' opinion in Chicago Profes-
sional Sports, specifically stated that the lower court had
misinterpreted the SBA. 112 Also, courts seem unable to decide
whether the SBA was meant to benefit the fans or the league itself."
l 3
Finally, the Durkin court could decide whether Copperweld and the
single-entity theory should be applied to professional sports leagues.
Durkin presents these opportunities because it is one of the first
cases in which the SBA has been challenged. The court should find,
however, that the SBA is special interest legislation meant to benefit
the leagues and not the fans. Thus, the argument that the SBA is not
108. Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 1992).
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
111. See generally Ross, supra note 77, at 469.
112. Chicago Prof Sports, 961 F.2d at 670 ("We therefore disagree with the district
court to the extent it thought that the Sports Broadcasting Act applies only when the
league arranges for (or permits) telecasting of every contest.").
113. See Blaich v. NFL, 212 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (the SBA helps the weaker
teams financially and the public interest in viewing).
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benefitting the fans as it was intended is moot. The SBA allows the
leagues to sell broadcast packages which result in a large portion of
the leagues' income, thereby helping to maintain their financial viabil-
ity. Also, it is clear that due to the changes in television broadcasting,
the SBA is equally applicable to cable package sales as it is to broad-
cast package sales. As for the issue of the single-entity theory, the
court should find that the leagues are not single-entities. They do not
work with a single unity of purpose, and therefore the Copperweld
principles are not applicable.

